From the comments to this post:
Don Rodrigo:
it’s looking more and more like us originalist Americans will have to find a way to form a viable shadow nation as have the illegal immigrants. If they can defy the real laws with impunity, then perhaps we’ll be able to defy the rules posing as laws with equal success.
Note: not a shadow government; a shadow nation.That’s a bleak vision right there. Until recently, gun owners like myself wisely stayed “closeted” or “under the radar” in California; what he’s talking about would be that experience ramped up by an order of magnitude. I’ve got family members who know intimately the illegal-immigrant experience; it’s a life, yes, but to say it’s an unpleasant one is an understatement.
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Also in the comments was a link to Glubb Pasha’s musings on the fate of human empires. If you thought we’d escaped Tytler’s 200-year lifespan limit for civilizations, think again. Glubb came up with an admittedly very debatable estimate of a roughly 250-year lifespan for them. Debatable, but very persuasive in some respects; the chart on page 2 of this document, and his discussion that follows, is well worth your attention. He writes:
(1) The present writer is exploring the facts, not trying to prove anything. The dates given are largely arbitrary. Empires do not usually begin or end on a certain date. There is normally a gradual period of expansion and then a period of decline. The resemblance in the duration of these great powers may be queried. Human affairs are subject to many chances, and it is not to be expected that they could be calculated with mathematical accuracy.
(2) Nevertheless, it is suggested that there is sufficient resemblance between the life periods of these different empires to justify further study.
[he adds the caveat] eleven such empires were listed, but these included only the Middle East and the modern nations of the West. India, China and Southern America were not included, because the writer knows nothing about them. A school founded to study the rise and fall of empires would probably find at least twenty-four great powers available for dissection and analysis.
I’m halfway through the document linked above at the moment I write this, and although the amateur historian in me is snarling about some of his presumptions, it’s certainly thought-provoking. It appears this was written in the 1970s; his conclusions on the United States are ahead of me, but I can already tell they will be interesting. In a superficial way he seems to have anticipated the arguments of the “Fourth Turning”/”Generations” folks, albeit from a different (in this case, “crotchety old man’s”) perspective:
The works of the contemporary historians of Baghdad in the early tenth century are still available. They deeply deplored the degeneracy of the times in which they lived, emphasising particularly the indifference to religion, the increasing materialism and the laxity of sexual morals. They lamented also the corruption of the officials of the government and the fact that politicians always seemed to amass large fortunes while they were in office. The historians commented bitterly on the extraordinary influence acquired by popular singers over young people, resulting in a decline in sexual morality. The ‘pop’ singers of Baghdad accompanied their erotic songs on the lute, an instrument resembling the modern guitar. In the second half of the tenth century, as a result, much obscene sexual language came increasingly into use, such as would not have been tolerated in an earlier age. Several khalifs issued orders banning ‘pop’ singers from the capital, but within a few years they always returned.
Uh huh. Emphasis mine. This is a guy born before the turn of the century, writing in the 1970s, when popular culture evidently appalled him. He wasn’t a feminist, that’s certain. Nevertheless:
The disorders following the military take- over in 861, and the loss of the empire, had played havoc with the economy. At such a moment, it might have been expected that everyone would redouble their efforts to save the country from bankruptcy, but nothing of the kind occurred. Instead, at this moment of declining trade and financial stringency, the people of Baghdad introduced a five-day week.
When I first read these contemporary descriptions of tenth-century Baghdad, I could scarcely believe my eyes. I told myself that this must be a joke! The descriptions might have been taken out of The Times today. The resemblance of all the details was especially breathtaking—the break-up of the empire, the abandonment of sexual morality, the ‘pop’ singers with their guitars, the entry of women into the professions, the five-day week.
Still, his conclusions seem persuasive in a lot of respects:
Any regime which attains great wealth and power seems with remarkable regularity to decay and fall apart in some ten generations. The ultimate fate of its component parts, however, does not depend on its internal nature, but on the other organisations which appear at the time of its collapse and succeed in devouring its heritage. Thus the lives of great powers are surprisingly uniform, but the results of their falls are completely diverse.
Ten generations, eh? Let’s see; we’re coming up on 235 years since Revolution….
Below the fold is Glubb’s summary of his observations.
Continue reading →
